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DICTA
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
ALLEN P. MITCHEM
Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law
While the new Certificate of Title Act I which was enacted by
the Colorado legislature last year has eliminated many of the pit-
falls of residents of this state who purchase or otherwise acquire
interests in automobiles, it will have little effect in resolving the
conflicts between interest acquired as a result of transactions occur-
ring in Colorado and prior interests which arose in another state if
the motor vehicles involved were registered in the other state. This
conflict of laws problem still remains. This problem, of course, is
not confined to interests in automobiles, but it may involve any
chattel which is removed from one state to another. Discussion of
the problem, however, is usually in terms of automobiles because
they are the chattels in which rights have been asserted in most
of the decided cases. This is true undoubtedly as a result of the
comparative ease with which an automobile may be removed from
one state to another.
A hypothetical case may serve to introduce the problem. Jones
buys a car in State X either under a conditional sale contract
wherein title is retained by the Brown Motor Company (the
vendor) until all payments are completed, or by giving the Brown
Motor Company a chattel mortgage to secure the unpaid balance,
either type of transaction being recognized as valid under the law
of State X. Thereafter, without the knowledge or consent of the
Brown Motor Company, Jones removes the car to Colorado where
interests in the car are asserted by attaching creditors of Jones,
or by a subsequent purchaser, mortgagee, or other lien holder, each
of whom acquired his interest without notice of the outstanding
interest which was created by the out of state security transaction.
The issue maybe stated as follows: Will the Colorado courts rec-
ognize the interest acquired by Brown Motor Company by virtue
of the transaction which took place in State X while the car was
located in that state?
The issue thus presented should be carefully distinguished
from the non-conflicts situation where the original transaction be-
tween Jones and Brown Motor Company took place in this state at
a time when the car was situated here. In such an event, the Colo-
rado courts should unquestionably determine the rights of the vari-
ous parties in accordance with the internal law of this state.
I COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 16, § 13 (Supp. 1949). For a summary of this Act, see Hel-
lerstein, Certificate of Title Law Effective August 1, 26 DICrA 175 (July, 1949).
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COLORADO LAW APPLICABLE IN NON-CONFLICTS SITUATIONS
Before proceeding to an analysis of the conflicts situation pre-
sented in the hypothetical problem, it might prove helpful to con-
sider momentarily some of the established rules of Colorado law
which would be applied to conditional sales and chattel mortgages
which had no contacts outside the state.
While there are significant differences in the nature of the
rights which arise between parties to chattel mortgages on the one
hand and parties to conditional sale contracts on the other hand,2
the Colorado courts have held that regardless of whether the in-
strument used be a conditional sale contract, chattel mortgage,
lease, trust deed, or other form, if it is intended to have the effect
of a mortgage or lien upon the property, it must be acknowledged
and filed for record. If this is not done, the property must be de-
livered to and remain in the possession of the vendor-mortgagee
before his rights will be superior to those of third parties who,
without notice, subsequently acquire an interest in the property.3
While it may be doubted that conditional sales are "intended to
have the effect of a mortgage or lien," 4 it is thus established that
they do have that effect as to third parties who subsequently acquire
rights without notice, and as to such third parties, they are given
the effect of absolute or unconditional sales.
It should be noted that the above rules became established in
reliance upon statutory provisions 5 no longer applicable to motor
vehicles which are subject to the new Certificate of Title Act.
However, that Act, which requires the existence of any "mortgage"
on a motor vehicle to be noted on the owner's certificate of title or
bill of sale in addition to being filed for public record, 7 defines
"mortgages" as including "chattel mortgages, conditional sales,
contracts, or any other like instrument intended to operate as a
mortgage or create a lien on a motor vehicle as security for an
undertaking of the owner." 8 It may thus be inferred that the Act
dealt only with the method of giving notice and left undisturbed
the previous holdings which refused to differentiate between chattel
mortgages and conditional sales with regard to the necessity of
giving notice to third persons.
THE THEORY OF THE CONFLICT OF LAW RULE
If it be assumed that the above is a correct statement of the
internal law of Colorado, it must be conceded that the law of most
other states is different, particularly with reference to conditional
'HELLERSTEIN, CHATTEL MORTGAGES IN COLORADO, § 2 (3rd ed. 1940).
'Illinois Co. v. Patterson, 91 Colo. 391, 15 P. 2d 699 (1932) ; Coors v. Reagan, 44
Colo. 126, 96 P. 966 (1908). The chattel mortgage (or conditional sale) will, however,
be valid as'between the parties thereto, COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 32, § 4 (1935), or as to
third parties with actual notice, COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 32, § 5 (1935).
'See Mr. Justice Butler dissenting in Illinois Co. v. Patterson, 91 Colo. 391, 408,
15 P. 2d 699, 705 (1932).
'COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 32, §1 and § 20 (1935).
.COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 16, § 13 (18) (Supp. 1949).
7 Ibid.
Old. c. 16, § i(2)(m).
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sale contracts, which, in the absence of express statutes to the
contrary, are recognized as valid even against third persons
without notice. As was pointed out by the dissenting justices
in a Colorado case decided in 1932,9 in the purchase of personal
property, the rule of caveat emptor ordinarily applies. Thus, a
lessee of chattels cannot, as against the lessor, pass title by sale
thereof even to a bona fide purchaser who has no notice of the les-
sor's title. Nor can a bailee or agent by his wrongful sale pass title
to a third person so as to cut off the interest of the bailor or
principal.
Consequently, it may be supposed that under the law of the
hypothetical State X, there is no statutory requirement for recording
the conditional sale contract or chattel mortgage, or it may be sup-
posed that there is such a requirement and that the instrument has
been recorded in accordance with the law of State X. In either
case, the result is the same, i.e. Brown Motor Company's interest
is protected and superior to that of creditors of Jones, at least so
long as the automobile remains in State X.
Upon the removal of the car to Colorado and upon assertion
of rights therein by Jones' creditors or a subsequent vendee, it
becomes necessary to choose between the law of State X and of
Colorado. Except as a state may have to alter it to meet require-
ments of statutory or constitutional law, a state may select any
choice of law rule which it wishes. However, the foremost objec-
tive of conflict of law rules is to prevent the outcome of litigation
from varying solely because of the place chosen to institute the
suit. This objective is dictated by reasons of fairness to all parties
concerned. It will be conceded that this objective is not always
attained; nevertheless, it is an objective which should be constantly
in mind in the application of any choice of law rule.
There appears to be no constitutional compulsion that either
the law of State X or the law of Colorado be applied in the problem
at hand. While it has been urged by respectable authority that
the state to which the chattel has been wrongfully removed has no
jurisdiction to divest the owner of his interest in the chattel,10
such a view has not found general acceptance. If the chattel is in
the second state, that state has power over such chattel, and it
seems that the second state can apply its own law to determine the
interests of persons therein.1 Nor does the Full Faith and Credit
Clause 12 require the choice of State X law, there having been no
judicial determination of the rights of the parties in that state.
It appearing that either choice of law is open to the Colorado
court, the first step normally taken by the forum (Colorado) is that
9 Illinois Co. v. Patterson, 91 Colo. 391, 415, 15 P. 2d 699, 705 (1932).
10 Beale, Jurisdiction Over Title of Absent Owner, 40 HARv. LAW Rev. 805 (1927).
1 Compare RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 268 and § 275 (1934) for the sug-
gestion that the interests of the mortgagee or conditional vendor are not divested as a
result of any dealings in the second state but that dealings with the chattel in a state
into which it is taken without consent of the mortgagee or conditional vendor may
result in new liens which have preference over the mortgage or conditional title.
1 U. S. CoNsT. ART. 4, § 1.
DICTA
of characterization. This involves a determination of the legal
nature of the problem. Is it one of tort, contract, property, etc.?
The answer to this question will be determined by reference to the
concepts of the forum. The problem at hand concerns interests in
property which were created by contract. If the mortgagee or con-
ditional vendor was trying to enforce a personal obligation created
by the contract, a court where the action was brought might easily
justify the conclusion that the legal nature of the problem was the
validity of the contract, in which case the Colorado court would
undoubtedly apply the law of the place of contracting,13 State X.
Where, however, the controversy in the second state involves
primarily claims of parties to interests in the chattel, as it does
in this hypothetical situation, the courts will characterize the prob-
lem as one of property. The governing law then becomes the law
of the state where the property was at the time of the transaction.
14
It may thus be seen that when the transaction took place in State
X at a time when the property was located in that state, regardless
of whether the problem was characterized as one of contracts or
of property, the rights of the parties should normally be determined
by the law of State X.
While this result is not reached because of any constitutional
compulsion and rests upon principles of so-called comity, there is
a great deal of merit in the rule. No state other than State X had
any concern in the matter at the time the interests of the parties
arose.
CONFLICT CASES IN THE COLORADO COURTS
The references to the usual choice of law rules in the preced-
ing paragraphs should not be understood as expressing the choice
of law rules usually applied in the Colorado courts. On the con-
trary, the decided cases in this state seem to indicate that the
Colorado law differs in this respect from that of most other states.
The first reported conflicts case wherein this type of problem
arose was Harper v. People.15 In that case the court upheld the
right of a conditional vendor against a domestic attaching creditor,
the conditional sale contract having been entered into in. Kansas.
The court was careful to note a distinction between this conflicts
case and an earlier non-conflicts case 16 wherein the conditional
sale was made in this state. The court in the Harper case stated
that wherever the lex loci contractus and the situs of the property
unite to sustain the validity of the contract, "it may be safely as-
serted that it is enforceable in the courts of every state where a
controversy arises over the title to the property."
17
' Cockburn v. Kinsley, 25 Colo. App. 89, 135 P. 1112 (1913).
, RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 265 and § 272 (1934).
U2 Colo. App. 177, 29 P. 1040 (1892).
"0George v. Tufts, 5 Colo. 162 (1869).
1 Harper v. People, supra at 179, 29 P. at 1040.
DICTA
Similar treatment was given in a 1920 case 18 to a chattel
mortgage on a truck which, although the sale and mortgage were
executed in Colorado, was described in the mortgage as being situ-
ated in Nebraska. The chattel mortgage was valid in Nebraska,
where it had been recorded, and it was therefore held valid and
enforceable in Colorado, even though the facts indicated that the
occasional removal to Colorado was with mortgagee's consent.
From these two cases, one might have concluded in 1920 that
regardless of the conditions that the internal law of Colorado would
have imposed upon the conditional vendor or mortgagee for the
protection of his interest, if that interest had arisen as a result of
a transaction in this state involving chattels here located, Colorado
would respect similar interests which had arisen in a sister state
and which were valid by the law of such state.
This seemingly harmonious state of affairs was soon shattered
insofar as conditional sales were concerned, however, by the much
discussed case of Turnbull v. Cole.19 The facts in that case were
that defendant's assignor had sold a car to one Keightley in Utah
by virtue of a contract reserving to the vendor the right to take
possession of the car upon default in payments and to sell it. The
contract appeared to impose upon the purchaser an unconditional
obligation to pay the agreed price; however,' under the law of Utah,
the contract was regarded as a conditional sale which did not pass
title. Utah law did not require the recording of such a contract
in order to protect the interest of the vendor. The car was sub-
sequently removed from Utah without the knowledge or consent
of the vendor, brought to Colorado, and sold to Bell, who mortgaged
it to Cole to secure a note for $600.
In a 4-3 decision sustaining the interest of the subsequent
mortgagee, Cole, the Colorado court said:
... Contracts like that here under consideration, reserving a
secret lien " to the vendor, will not be recognized as leaving title in
the vendor, as against interested parties without notice. . . . The
contract, though valid in Utah, could not be enforced in this state,
because such action would be contrary to public policy, and would
result in detriment to the interests of a citizen of this state. Both
of these grounds furnish exceptions to the general rule of comity
as applied to the enforcement of contracts.
It will be seen that the Colorado court here recognized that the
"general rule of comity" would require the enforcement of con-
tracts validly entered into in a sister state. The validity of the
grounds for exception will be discussed later.
The case of Turnbull v. Cole was followed in two subsequent
cases 21 wherein the rights of conditional vendors (arising in other
states from transactions which, although unrecorded, were valid
':Flora v. Julesburg Motor Co., 69 Colo. 238, 193 P. 545 (1920).
" 70 Colo. 364, 201 P. 887 (1921).
0 Emphasis added.
" American Equitable Assurance Co. v. Hall, 93 Colo. 186, 24 P. 2d 980 (1933)
Commercial Credit Co. v. Higbee, 92 Colo. 346, 20 P. 2d 543 (1933).
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by the laws of such states) were denied recognition. On the other
hand, in the intervening case of Mosko v. Matthews 22 the Colorado
court gave recognition to the interest of an Oklahoma mortgagee
in a car which had been mortgaged in Oklahoma, the chattel mort-
gage being recorded in that state, and subsequently removed to
Colorado without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee.
Despite the language in these cases which indicated that the
interests of the vendors were not recognized because conditional
sale contracts create a "secret lien" which is against the public
policy of Colorado, whereas the interest of a mortgagee who had
recorded his mortgage would be recognized, it was urged that there
was a more satisfactory explanation for the different treatment
given in the Colorado courts to these two types of transactions.
This explanation is well stated in the Colorado Annotations to the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws as follows :23
It is submitted that the rule of Turnbull v. Cole should be re-
stricted to cases in which the conditional sale contract is not filed
or recorded in the state of the original situs. There is no evidence
* . . (that such) ... contracts were so recorded. The danger of in-
jury to citizens of Colorado is no greater in the case of a conditional
sale contract recorded in the state of original situs but not in Colo-
rado than in the case of a chattel mortgage recorded in the same
way.
In the more recent case of Castle v. Commercial Investment
Trust Corp.,2 4 however, this seemingly logical explanation of the
Colorado position was repudiated. There the conditional sale con-
tract which had been executed in New York was recorded in New
York. The subject of the sale, a car, was later removed to Colorado
without the consent of the vendor plaintiff. In holding that a bona
fide purchaser in Colorado had a claim superior to that of the New
York vendor, the court was content to state that the comity rule
does not extend to such a contract as the one there involved. Evi-
dently the court found itself unable to support the position that the
plaintiff had a "secret lien" which was repugnant to the public
policy of Colorado, the conditional sale contract having been made
a public record which was "notice to the world"; however, no other
explanation was given for the decision.
The most recent Colorado case 25 dealing with a conditional
sale contract entered into in another state shed no light upon the
problem here under discussion, for there the Colorado purchaser
from the conditional vendee had actual notice of the limited interest
of the conditional vendee. The court, therefore, recognized the
title of the conditional vendor.
CRITIQUE OF THE COLORADO POSITION
From the foregoing discussion, it would seem that the follow-
ing conclusions could be safely drawn from the Colorado cases:
2 87 Colo. 55, 284 P. 1021 (1930).
2 Annotation to § 272 (1936).
2100 Colo. 191, 66 P. 2d 804 (1937).
25 Reavis v. Stockel, 120 Colo ...... 208 P. 2d 94 (1949).
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(1) The rights accruing to a mortgagee from a chattel mortgage
executed in State X while the chattel was there situated will be
recognized in Colorado even as against third parties without no-
tice, provided that the mortgage was recorded in and valid under
the law of State X. (2) The rights of the mortgagee in (1) above
probably would not be recognized in Colorado if the mortgage was
unrecorded in State X (even assuming that such a transaction was
valid as against third parties by the law of State X) because of the
Colorado abhorrence of "secret liens". (3) The title of a conditional
vendor will not be recognized in Colorado as against third parties
without notice where the conditional sale was executed in State X
while the chattel was there situated even if the contract was re-
corded in and valid under the law of State X. (4) As between the
contracting parties or as against third persons with actual notice,
the rights accruing in State X to either a conditional vendor or
mortgagee will be recognized in Colorado regardless of whether
the contract was recorded in State X, provided such contract was
valid according to the law of State X.
The primary quarrel that the writer has with the position of
the Colorado courts concerns the second and third statements
above, particularly the third. It should be remembered that in all
the foregoing discussion, it was assumed that the removal of the
chattel to Colorado was without the knowledge or consent of the
vendor-mortgagee. The converse situation would clearly call for
the result reached by the Colorado courts. The weight of authority
is to the effect that, if the removal of the property to the second
state was contemplated at the time of the contract, the vendor's
title will not be protected as against persons who purchase the prop-
erty in the second state in good faith from the vendee, or as against
creditors of the vendee who levy thereon, after such removal, un-
less filed or recorded in the second state as provided by local law.26
On the other hand, if the removal was not so contemplated, and if
removal was without the knowledge or consent of the vendor, the
courts in virtually all states, the notable exceptiotis being Texas, 27
Illinois, 28 and Colorado, afford protection to the vendor's title with-
out the necessity of recording in the second state. The undesirable
results of a contrary doctrine are clearly seen in the following
passage by Professor Beale, referring to the Texas law, which is
similar to that of Colorado :29
It appears to be a regular course of business for a swindler
to buy a motor car on credit in California or elsewhere, drive it
into Texas, and sell or pledge it there. The original seller is.help-
less in the face of this practice; and Texas will doubtless continue
full of willing bona fide buyers. That this result is most unfor-
tunate from the point of view of commercial practice is clear.
26 See collection of cases in 25 A.L.R. 1153 at 1158 (1923).
27Consolidated Garage Co. v. Chambers, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S.W. 1072 (1921)
"Judy v. Evans, 109 Ill. App. 155 (1903).
"Beale, Jurisdiction Over Title of Absent Owner, 40 HARV. LAW REv. 805, 810
(1927).
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The right of Colorado to maintain a public policy against the
use of conditional sales contracts in purely local transactions is not
open to question. There are other states having a similar local
policy; however, even in those states, the position is generally taken
that, notwithstanding the local rule on conditional sales, where the
contract is entered into in another state in which it is valid and
has the effect of reserving title, it may be enforced in the forum,
and such reserved rights will be superior to those of a subsequent
purchaser from the vendee.
30
When there is an attempt to apply this doctrine not only to
local transactions, but also to the valid transactions in other states,
entirely different considerations are present. Mere dissimilarities
in the law of the forum and that of State X do not alone justify the
refusal to enforce a valid foreign right. In the words of Justice
Cardozo, s'
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at
the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expedi-
ency or fairness. They do not close their doors unless help would
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent con-
ception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal."
This sense of obligation was expressed by a Colorado court in
Harper v. People, supra as follows: "The contract will not be
deemed to be opposed to the policy of this state unless based on
immoral or criminal considerations."
Is it a violation of a fundamental principle of justice to recog-
nize the title of a conditional vendor when that title is valid by
the law of the only jurisdiction in which he has knowingly per-
mitted the property to be present? Is there any immoral or criminal
consideration involved in such recognition? If the Colorado courts
would relent in the future with respect to conditional sale con-
tracts that were recorded in a sister state, should they not also
recognize the title of conditional vendors acquired in other states
wherein the law did not require recordation of such interests?
Would it be a violation of the deep-rooted tradition of our common-
weal to recognize the title of a conditional vendor from State
X (where the law does not require recordation) if our courts had
determined to recognize the title of a conditional vendor from
State Y (where the law requires recordation) ? Or is recordation
in a foreign state only of dubious value in protecting Colorado
citizens ?
It is not to be inferred that a state such as Colorado should
disregard the welfare of its citizens who deal with non-residents.
It is submitted, however, that any attempted distinction between
out-of-state chattel mortgages and out-of-state conditional sales
" Security Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 9 La. App. 651, 120 So. 250 (1928) ; Fry Bros.
v. Theobold, 205 Ky. 146, 265 S.W.489 (1924); Barrett v. Kelley, 66 Vt. 515, 29 Atl.
809 (1894).
'2Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
2 Emphasis added.
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contracts, when both are recorded in the other state, relates only to
minor morals of expediency and debatable questions of internal
policy. It is further submitted that recordation in a distant state,
where the transaction is valid by both the lex loci contractus and
the law of the situs of the property, is of doubtful value in protect-
ing Colorado citizens.
One method by which states have afforded a measure of pro-
tection to their citizens is exemplified by section 14 of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act by which the reservation of title in the vendor
is void as to certain purchasers and creditors, when the property
is removed into another state, unless the vendor, within ten days
after he has received notice of the removal, records the contract
in the state to which the goods have been removed. This principle
could be extended so as to apply to chattel mortgages. A second
type of protection is found in statutes which give certain classes
of lien holders, i.e. repairmen, priority over the title of the con-
ditional vendor. Doubtless there are numerous other measures
which a state may adopt for the protection of its citizens, and yet
be consistent with a sense of fairness to citizens of other states.
But to refuse recognition to rights arising out of certain types of
transactions in other states merely because we would prefer the
use of other types of transactions is to evidence a provincialism
which has no place in our modern commercial life.
Exit Horatio (Laughing)
ANONYMOUS
of the Englewood Bar
In formal format, Dicta's slick
With supra, ibid., et seq., sic;
(Boy, those footnotes-fast and thick!)
'Smatter, pal, prefer confetti,
Arthur Godfrey, girls by Petty,
Milton Berle, and etty cetty?
No! Go read Popham, Creamer, Grossman,
Percy Morris and all of those men
WArho're not exactly Billy Rose men.
'Twixt hydrogen and between uranium,
You'll need an up-and-coming brainium
(And you, with your ailing, run-down cranium!)
Sit up with Dicta at the midnight forge.
Horatio and I'll 'be with Gorgeous George.
